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ABSTRACT
We address the problem of connectivity in Secure Wireless
Sensor Networks (SWSN) using random pre-distribution of
keys. We propose a geometric random model for SWSNs.
Under this new and realistic model, we describe how to de-
sign secure and connected networks using a small constant
number of keys per sensor. Extensive simulations support
the above stated result and demonstrate how connectivity
can be guaranteed for a wide interval of practical network
sizes and sensor communication ranges.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer Systems Organization]: computer com-
munication networks—Distributed Systems; E.1 [Data]: data
structures—graphs and networks; H.4.3 [Information Sys-
tems]: information system applications—communication ap-
plications.
General Terms
Security.
Keywords
Key management, sensor networks, random graphs, proba-
bilistic key sharing, connectivity.
1. INTRODUCTION
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of sen-
sors whose size can range from a few hundred sensors to a
few hundred thousand or possibly more. The sensors do not
rely on any pre-deployed network architecture, thus they
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communicate via an ad-hoc wireless network. The power
supply of each individual sensor is provided by a battery,
whose consumption for both communication and computa-
tion activities must be optimized. Distributed in irregu-
lar patterns across remote and often hostile environments,
sensors should autonomously aggregate into collaborative,
peer-to-peer networks. Sensor networks must be robust and
survivable in order to overcome individual sensor failure and
intermittent connectivity (due, for instance, to a noisy chan-
nel or a shadow zone). It is widely believed that WSNs can
be useful in a plentiful variety of settings. In many applica-
tions establishing secure pair-wise communications can be
useful. In particular, it is a pre-requisite for the implemen-
tation of secure routing, and can be useful for secure group
communications as well. However, due to the scarceness of
resources, public key cryptography is not a viable solution;
confidentiality has to be enforced by using symmetric key al-
gorithms. Key management is thus a central issue in secure
wireless sensor networks.
In key pre-distribution schemes, the symmetric keys are
distributed to all sensors before deployment on the ground.
If we know which sensors will be in the same neighborhood
before sensor deployment, keys could be assigned to sensors
a priori using this information. However, such a knowledge
does not often exist, as assumed by a number of the key
pre-distribution schemes in the literature [6, 8, 1] and by
the random key pre-deployment scheme [11], one of the most
promising solutions recently proposed.
A Secure Wireless Sensor Network (SWSN) is composed
on N sensors. Each sensor is pre-assigned a key ring of k
secret keys randomly drawn from a common pool of K ran-
dom keys. The sensors are then randomly deployed in a
given geographical area. Two sensors share a secure com-
munication link if they lie within communication range and
they share a common pre-assigned key. A fundamental prob-
lem in secure wireless sensor networks is to choose proper k
and K such that the network is connected by using secure
links alone. This problem has been earlier addressed by Es-
chenauer and Gligor in [11]. Their methodology is based
on the well-known random graph model and on the classical
result on connectivity from Erdo¨s and Re´nyi [10]. However,
we argue that the model in [11] is not completely satisfac-
tory for secure wireless sensor networks. The model does not
include a notion of geometric position of the sensors in the
space and, as a consequence, it cannot properly model the
inherent locality of physical visibility among sensors. In this
respect, our model is more realistic, since it does take into
consideration the physical position of the sensors. More seri-
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ously perhaps, the Erdo¨s—Renyi model assumes that edges
exist independently. As shown in this paper this is far from
being true and therefore the Erdo¨s—Renyi model cannot be
used as a reliable guide to design secure wireless networks.
In this paper, we show how to design secure wireless sen-
sor networks that are connected with high probability even
if each sensor is assigned a small constant number of keys.
Our model gives precise indications on how to choose the
relevant parameters, pool size and key ring size, in order to
have very high probability of connectivity. In particular, we
prove that key rings of very small size, two or more, already
ensure high probability of connectivity. These model predic-
tions are fully confirmed by our extensive set of experiments.
Our simulations compel the conclusion that our design guar-
antees connectivity for a wide interval of practical network
sizes and communication ranges.
2. RELATED WORK
The idea of probabilistic key sharing for WSNs is intro-
duced by Eschenauer and Gligor [11]. The authors also pro-
vide a simple and centralized algorithm for re-keying in a
distributed WSN. Later, in [7], three mechanisms are de-
scribed in the framework of random key pre-distribution.
First of all, the q-composite random key pre-distribution
scheme, a modification of the basic scheme in [11], achieves
better security under small scale attack while trading off
increased vulnerability in the face of a large scale physical
attack on the network sensors. Secondly, the multi-path key
reinforcement protocol substantially increases the security of
the channel by leveraging the security of other links. Lastly,
the random-pairwise keys scheme assigns private pairwise
keys to randomly selected pairs of sensors so as to guarantee
that the rest of the network remains fully secure even when
some of the sensors have been compromised. Moreover, this
latter scheme supports node to node authentication.
Two recent schemes build up a secure pairwise channel
which combine a deterministic technique with a pre-distri-
bution random scheme. The first scheme is proposed in
[9]. The authors use a deterministic protocol proposed by
Blom [3] that allows any pair of nodes in a network to find
a pairwise secret key. As a salient feature, Blom’s scheme
guarantees a so called λ-secure property : as long as no more
than λ nodes are compromised, the network is perfectly se-
cure. A λ-secure data structure built this way is called a key
space. The authors in [9] create a set W composed of ω key
spaces, and randomly assign up to τ spaces per sensor. Two
nodes can find a common secret key if they have picked a
common key space. The second scheme is proposed in [12].
In principle, this work is similar to [9], where Blundo et al’s
polynomial scheme [4] is used instead of Blom’s.
Connectivity properties have been studied for non-secure
wireless sensor networks as well. In [2], a geometric random
model has been used to investigate minimum node degree
and h-connectivity. Using a recent asymptotic result from
Penrose [13], Bettstetter experimentally shows how to com-
pute a communication range r such that, for a given number
of nodes and a given integer h, the network is guaranteed to
be h-connected. Equivalently, it is possible to compute how
many sensors are needed to cover a given geographical area
with an h-connected network.
3. CONNECTIVITY OF SECURE WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 Preliminaries
We say that f(n) = o(1) if f(n) goes to zero as n goes to
infinity. If an event (depending on n) happens with proba-
bility 1− o(1), we say that it occurs with high probability.
Fact 1. (Union Bound)
Let E1, . . . , Em be m events. Then,
Pr
 
m

i=1
Ei  ≤
m

i=1
Pr [Ei] .
Fact 2. (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bounds)
Let X =  ni=1 Xi where the Xi’s are independently dis-
tributed in [0, 1]. Then,
Pr[X < EX − t] ≤ e−2t2/n.
We recall some basic facts and definitions from graph the-
ory (see for instance [5]). As customary V (G) and E(G) de-
note the vertex and the edge set of a graph G, respectively.
Given a graph G = (V, E) a cut is a proper subset S ⊆ V
such that there is no edge connecting a vertex in S with a
vertex in V − S.
Fact 3. A graph G is connected if and only if it has no
cuts.
Let S be a set. The collection of all subsets of S of cardi-
nality k is denoted as 
S
k 
.
The terms point, node and vertex will be used interchange-
ably.
3.2 Connectivity
We want to study the connectivity properties of the fol-
lowing geometric, random graph model.
Definition 1. Let K be the size of a finite set of keys, and
let k ≤ K be a fixed parameter. Let [K] = {1, 2, . . . , K}
be the index set of the keys in the common pool of size K.
The graph GNr,k,K is defined as the geometric random graph
obtained by the following procedure:
• First, each node u is assigned a subset of keys, its key
ring, whose indexes are in Ku ⊆ [K] by sampling [K]
with replacement k times.
• Second, the N nodes are distributed uniformly at ran-
dom on the given square geographical area, that, with-
out loss of generality, we assume to be of side one
(called the unit square).
• Third, uv is an edge if (a) the two nodes are within
distance r and (b) Ku ∩Kv 6= ∅.
The resulting graph GNr,k,K is called a kryptograph with
parameters r, k, K and N . In the special case in which
every two nodes are within transmission range, the so-called
full visibility case, the resulting graph is denoted as GNk,K .
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In the sequel, for sake of simplicity we shall identify [K]
with the set of keys and Ku with the key ring of a vertex
u. It is important to realize that edges of a kryptograph do
not exist independently. Consider for instance three points
x, y and z, all within distance r of each other, whose key
rings are of size 2. And suppose that K = 104. This
is a realistic scenario since, as we shall see, key rings of
size 2 suffice for high probability of connectivity. Assume
that we know already that edges xy and yz exist. What
is the probability that edge xz also exists? If we assume
independence then this probability is ∼ 1
5000
, but in real-
ity Pr[xz exists | both xy and yz exist] ∼ 1
2
! This clearly
shows that the classical Erdo¨s-Renyi model proposed in [11]
is not a reliable guide to design secure wireless networks, the
geographical nature of the network notwithstanding.
Assuming that the key rings are generated by sampling
with replacement not only simplifies the analysis of connec-
tivity. In fact, sampling without replacement can only be
better. To see this, suppose each node picks a set of size k
in the following way. It first picks a set by sampling with re-
placement k times. Now, if did not pick k distinct elements
it picks whatever more is needed by sampling without re-
placement. So, in the end it has a set of size exactly k, and
the distribution of this key ring is uniform. Thus, we can
always assume that key rings sampled without replacement
were generated by this process, but the key rings we consider
in the proofs (i.e. the first k samples) are actually subsets
of the actual sets the nodes hold. So, if there is connectivity
using sampling with replacement there must be connectivity
using sampling without replacement.
Generating key rings without replacement on the other
hand slightly worsen the security of the network, since the
key rings on average are slightly smaller. As we shall see
however the effect is a completely negligible. Thus, it ap-
pears that the kryptograph is the right graph-theoretic model
for SWSNs.
As we shall see below, in the full visibility case, where
every two sensors are within transmission range, in order to
have high probability of connectivity in kryptographs (and
thus in secure wireless sensor networks), it suffices to have
k ≥ 2 and K ≈ N/ log N . In the general case, when we
distribute N sensors in the unit square and r is the trans-
mission radius, the latter becomes K ≈ r2N/ log N +2 log r.
To increase the probability of connectivity, we can either in-
crease k or decrease K. The condition on K is quite robust,
i.e. values of K that are bigger of a constant factor than the
above bounds can in practice guarantee high probability of
connectivity, as shown by the experiments in Section 4. This
has important (positive) consequences for the security of the
network. Similarly, the very weak condition on k (k ≥ 2)
allows for great flexibility.
We introduce some notation and definitions. We divide
the unit square into `2 square cells of equal size, where `
is the smallest integer greater than or equal to
√
5/r. This
choice ensures that any two points in adjacent cells, or in
the same cell, are within transmission radius.
Given a collection C = {S1, . . . , Sn} of key rings, the graph
H := H(C) is defined as follows. The vertex set of H is [K],
the set of all keys. A pair of keys xy is an edge of H if
there exists a set S ∈ C to which both x and y belong.
The crux of our argument is the following. A collection of
key rings C induces two different graph. The kryptograph
and the the graph H(C) just defined. If the collection of key
rings is chosen according to definition 1, then H is connected
with very high probability and if H is connected, so is the
kryptograph. Let us now proceed formally.
Definition 2. A collection C = {S1, . . . , Sn} of key rings
is a good collection if H(C) is connected.
A set P of points such that every two of them are within
transmission range is a set of close neighbours.
Definition 3. Let P be a set of n close neighbours, and let
C be the corresponding collection of key rings. The graph
GP,C is the kryptograph whose vertex set is P and where uv
is an edge if Ku ∩Kv 6= ∅, where Ku, Kv ∈ C.
Lemma 1. Let P be a set of close neighbours and let C
be the corresponding set of key rings. If H(C) is connected
then GP,C is connected.
Proof. By Fact 3 if we show that G := GP,C has no cuts
the claim follows. Let S be a proper subset of V (G), let
k(S) := ∪u∈SKu and let y ∈ V − S. Now, since H := H(C)
is connected, the set k(S) is not a cut for H. Therefore
there must be an edge between a vertex (key) x ∈ k(S) and
a vertex (key) y ∈ [K] − k(S). By definition of H, xy is an
edge of H only if there is a key ring Kv such that x ∈ Kv
and y ∈ Kv. By definition of k(S), v 6∈ S. Now, since
x ∈ k(S) there must be some other key ring Ku such that
x ∈ Ku and u ∈ S. But this implies that uv is an edge of G
and therefore S is not a cut of G.
The following theorem shows that key rings of size k ≥ 4
suffice for very high probability of connectivity, provided
that K = n/ log n. The case k ≥ 2 also holds, but it must
be dealt with separately.
Theorem 1. Let P be a set of n close neighbours and
let C denote the corresponding set of key rings generated by
sampling k times without replacement from a set [K]. Let
c ≥ 1, k ≥ 2(c + 1) and K := n/ log n. Then, the probability
that C is not a good collection is at most
b(n) :=
n−c
1 − n−c ∼ n
−c.
Proof. We need to show that the probability that H :=
H(C) is not connected is at most b(n) ∼ n−c. We will do
this using Fact 3. Fix a subset S of [K] of size s ≤ K/2.
We say that S is crossed if there exists a key ring Ki ∈ C
that non-trivially intersects both S and the complement of
S. The probability that S is not crossed is,
Pr[S is not crossed]
≤   s
K 
k
+  1 − s
K 
k  n
≤  1− s
K 
kn

1 +  
s
K − s

k

n
≤ exp  −skn
K 
exp  
s
K − s

k
n 	
≤ exp  −skn
2K 
exp 
 
 
s
K − s

k
− sk
2K

n 	 .
Since s ≤ K/2, we have that s/(K − s) ≤ 1. So, we can ig-
nore the exponent k above and bound the failure probability
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by,
Pr[S is not crossed]
≤ exp  −skn
2K 
exp  
s
K − s −
sk
2K 
n

.
Again, K − s ≥ K/2, so that
Pr[S is not crossed]
≤ exp  −skn
2K 
exp  
2s
K
− sk
2K 
n

≤ exp  −skn
2K 
.
The last inequality follows from the assumption k ≥ 4 which
implies that the second exponential is no more than 1. Re-
calling that k ≥ 2(c + 1) and that K := n/ log n, we can
bound the probability that H is disconnected using the union
bound, as follows.
Pr[H disconnected = Pr[∃S, S is a cut]
= Pr[∃S, S is not crossed]
≤
K/2

s=1

S∈([K]
s
)
Pr[S is not crossed]
<
∞

s=1
ns Pr[S is not crossed, |S| = s]
≤
∞

s=1
ns exp  −skn
2K 
≤
∞

s=1
n−cs
=
n−c
1− n−c ∼ n
−c
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let P be a set of n close neighbours and
let C denote the corresponding set of key rings generated by
sampling k times without replacement from a set K. Let
k ≥ 2 and K := n/ log n. Then, the probability that C is not
a good collection is a
o(1) ∼ 1
log n
.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of the theorem,
but the calculations differ. Let S be a subset of [K] of size
s ≤ K/2. Since k ≥ 2, K = n/ log n and 2(K − s) ≥ K, the
probability that S is not crossed is,
Pr[S is not crossed] ≤  

s
K

k
+

1− s
K

k  n
≤    s
K 
2
+  1 − s
K 
2 
n
≤   1 − 2s(K − s)
K2

n
≤

1 − s
K

n
≤ esn/K = n−s.
Thus,
Pr[H disconnected = Pr[∃S, S is not crossed]
≤
K/2

s=1

S∈([K]
s
)
Pr[S is not crossed]
≤
∞

s=1
Ksn−s
=
∞

s=1
1
logs n
∼ 1
log n
.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that in the full visibility
case kryptographs are connected with high probability. If
k := 2(c+1) the probability that the graph is not connected
is ∼ n−c. Corollary 1 gives a weaker, but still high probabil-
ity guarantee for the case k ≥ 2. We now extend the result
to the general case.
First we establish another useful property of a good col-
lection.
Lemma 2. Let P be the set of points inside a cell C, and
let C be the corresponding collection of key rings. If C is
a good collection, then any node in an adjacent cell is con-
nected to some node inside C.
Proof. The claim follows by observing that if C is a good
collection then ∪S∈CS = [K]. To see this, just observe that
since H(C) is connected, for all x ∈ [K], {x} is not a cut of
H.
Recall that by definition of ` a set of points inside a cell
is a set of close neighbours. Theorem 1 says that inside
each cell the graph is connected, while this lemma says that
subgraphs contained in adjacent cells are connected to each
other. This way we see that the whole of GNr,k,K is con-
nected. The next theorem simply estimates the probability
that GNr,k,K fails to be connected.
Theorem 2. Let k ≥ 2 and K := N/ log N . Then, the
probability that GNr,k,K is not connected is o(1).
Proof. Fix a cell C and let X be the random variable
denoting the number of points to fall inside C. Then EX =
N/`2 and, by the Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds,
Pr[∃ a cell with less than N/2`2 points] ≤ `2e−N/2`4 = o(1).
Invoking Corollary 1 and using the union bound, we have a
total error probability of at most,
`2e−N/2`
4
+ `2(1 + o(1))
1
log n
= o(1).
Therefore, GNr,k,K is connected with probability 1−o(1).
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
In principle, it could be possible that our theoretical re-
sults do not exactly predict the properties of small sized
secure wireless sensor networks. This is not the case. Our
simulations say that, even though small networks are harder
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Figure 1: Randomly generated secure sensor net-
work of size 200. Communication range is 0.2, key
ring size is 4, and pool size is 50. Lighter lines mean
physical visibility, darker lines secure visibility. This
graph is connected by using secure links alone.
to connect (they might easily be physically disconnected),
our results are robust enough to be valid starting from small
network sizes. In all of the following experiments, key ring
size is constant and fixed to 4. Clearly, if key ring size in-
creases, connectivity probability also increases considerably.
To help understanding the structure of secure wireless sen-
sor networks, Figures 1, 2, and 3 show three similar net-
works where the pool size is increased from 50 to 100 and
then to 150. Note that, as soon as the pool size is too
big to guarantee connectivity, isolated sensors start to ap-
pear in the graph. This is perfectly analogous to what is
predicted by well-known graph-theoretic results on similar
random models and very important from a practical point
of view. Indeed, even in the remote probability that our
design methodology generate a disconnected graph, it is al-
most surely connected except a very small number of iso-
lated points.
Figure 4 shows the probability of network connectivity
as a function of the pool size. Network size N is 500 and
1,000, key ring size is 4, and communication range is 0.2.
As it can be readily checked, a pool size K = N/2 log N
guarantees that the sensor network be connected. Factor
1/2 depends on constant k (set to 4 in our experiments) and
on the communication range and is larger than the constant
factor in our asymptotic results. This fact experimentally
demonstrates that our theoretical results are robust. As a
further experiment, with the same pool size K = N/2 log N ,
we generated a large number of networks for increasing N
and fixed communication range. These networks are virtu-
ally “always” connected. Indeed, we got no disconnected
SWSNs among the 10,000 networks generated per each sin-
gle size N from 500 to 10,000, step 100.
Figure 2: Randomly generated secure sensor net-
work of size 200. Communication range is 0.2, key
ring size is 4, and pool size is 100. Lighter lines mean
physical visibility, darker lines secure visibility. The
network has a few isolated sensors.
Figure 3: Randomly generated secure sensor net-
work of size 200. Communication range is 0.2, key
ring size is 4, and pool size is 150. Lighter lines
mean physical visibility, darker lines secure visibil-
ity. The network has a slightly larger number of
isolated sensors and even some very small discon-
nected components.
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Figure 4: Probability of connectivity of a secure sen-
sor network of 500 and 1000 nodes as a function of
the pool size.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we introduce a novel and realistic model for
secure wireless sensor networks using random pre-distribution
of keys. Under this model, the notion of local visibility is
natural and connectivity can be formally studied. In partic-
ular, we show that pool size can be fixed in such a way that
generated sensor networks are connected with high proba-
bility even assigning a small constant number of keys to each
sensor. For example, our experiments shows that a SWSN
of 10,000 sensors, communication range 0.2, key ring size 4,
and pool size 550 is virtually always connected, in agreement
with our theoretical results.
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